

# STANFORD UNIVERSITY

## OFFICIAL EXAMINATION BOOK

Question	Score
1	
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Name of Student Johanna Freedman

Date of Examination Nov. 1, 1968

Subject German 140

HONORABLE CONDUCT  
in academic work is the spirit of conduct in this University.

In recognition of and in the spirit of the Honor Code, I certify that I will neither receive nor give unpermitted aid on this examination and that I will report, to the best of my ability, all Honor Code violations observed by me.

(signed)

Johanna Freedman  
Name

### SUGGESTIONS FOR CONDUCT

1. Occupy alternate seats where possible.
2. When in doubt as to the meaning of a question, consult the instructor. He will be found in his office.

this is especially good.

## Brecht - Andrea - Galileo

1. In this quotation, Andrea is stating what he believes to be the new ethic of the New Age. He says ~~scientific~~ scientific progress is the property of a few individuals who must at all costs preserve their own lives.

In this new ethic, pure knowledge is most important. <sup>The quotation</sup> is a paraphrase of the statement "better soiled than empty."

Andrea says that if the Inquisition had martyred Galileo, they would have been victorious. Thus he implies that the scientist's responsibility is to produce knowledge, not concern himself with social problems. Brecht, of course, supports the opposite point of view, maintaining that contribution to knowledge will not justify lack of social commitment. In reality, scientific advance is never the product of an individual. And if this individual ignores humanity, scientific progress may well represent human catastrophe.

science a nice a physical pleasure

good

## Hesse - Heller - Steppenwolf

2. Steppenwolf is discussing a ~~characteristic~~ <sup>tendency</sup> of German intellectuals to surrender themselves to the enervating influence of music, instead of dedicating themselves to reason and the world. The quotation is an excellent example of Heller's ambivalent position in society. On the one hand, he feels a ~~and~~ responsibility to "fight against this tendency like a man," a feeling which is in essence historical and produces such activities as writing pacifist literature. In general, however, Steppenwolf inclines to an ahistorical inwardness, a private path leading to the Immortals, "toward" a speech without words," through music and humor. He puts ultimate faith not in rationalism, but in aesthetic creation, upon which he relies to separate him from the restricting influence of time.

excellent

Frisch - Stiller - "I'm Not Stiller"

3. Stiller suggests here that conventional definitions of identity may often be invalid and meaningless. On a literal level, Stiller has only to admit that he is indeed Stiller and he will become free - ie, released from prison. But in another sense, he will be far from free because he will be "condemned to play a part that has nothing to do" with him.

In this quotation he brings the whole ~~question~~ problem of identity into question. Do outward appearances determine reality, as the Swiss are so fond of believing? Often, outward facts - dates, photographs - tell a lie about the inner man and condemn him to a repetition of a role which has ceased to be relevant to him. He regards conventional identity as an act which is performed primarily for the convenience of the rest of the world, so that he can be

excellent

## Lehmann "Enraptured Dust"

4. Lehmann, in the concluding lines of "Enraptured Dust," intimates an optimism concerning man's ultimate destiny. He contrasts the dust, which represents the earth and nature, with the "sobbing desolation" suggested by the militant imagery of the phrase "squadrons of clouds." He also contrasts the artificial bird of man, bringing death and destruction, dumping dung in the puddle, and the lark, the natural bird, which will redeem man. In these lines, Lehmann characteristically turns to specific objects in nature in his search for salvation. Like the turkey of the preceding stanza "a handful of dust" has become enchanted, transformed into a song of praise.

and a sharing of suffering as well as bread. The quotation suggests the development of the peccatorial saint who in a manner at times requires at times divine, recognizes his own guilt as



## Borchert-Beckmann - The Man Outside

5. Beckmann expresses modern man's disillusionment with the traditional image of God. He complains that God ignores man and permits him to suffer in silence. His blood is thinned with the ink of an irrelevant literature. The God that man has fashioned is old-fashioned and pathetic. He has become alienated from his children to the extent that they do not even experience a mutual anger, but only a sorrowful lack of communication. Borchert suggests in the exchange between man and God that God is not dead, but only forgotten. The stereotyped image of God is inadequate, he says. Man's salvation lies not in the sterile words of abstracted theologians, but in Christian companionship ~~and~~ a sharing of suffering ~~and~~ as well as bread. The quotation suggests the development of the picaresque saint, who in a manner at times roguish or at times divine, recognizes his own guilt as

Bochert Beckmann - The Man Outside

well as the guilt of all humanity.

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# 20th c. German Lit

Your paper is well conceived and well-stated. An even better "dialectic", though not as neatly within the confines of the course, would perhaps be Genet - Brecht

<sup>Weiss.</sup>  
or Beckett vs. Brecht.  
I suggest reading an essay by the Hungarian critic Georg Lukács, "The Ideology of Modernism" in his book Realism in Our Times. If you can get through his orthodoxy you'll find I think, some pretty brilliant insights. Take a look, also, at Susan Sontag's comments in M/S in her collection Against Interpretation.

THE SEARCH FOR INNER HARMONY  
VERSUS  
THE COMMITMENT TO REVOLUTION

A dialectical analysis of Hesse, Brecht and Weiss

Yet action, by which we use temporal things, well, differs from contemplation of eternal things.

- St. Augustine, On the Trinity

Johanna Freedman  
German 140  
December 1, 1968



Hermann Hesse. Bertolt Brecht. Each defines a way of life eliciting enthusiastic response in American youth. Aspiring hippies identify with Hesse's aesthetic denunciation of the bourgeoisie. Translated into current idiom, his message becomes, perhaps unfairly, "Drop out, tune in, turn on." On the other hand, young radicals of the left rebel against the personal nature of Hesse's salvation. While not accepting Brecht's doctrinaire Communism, as propounded, for example, in The Measures Taken, they applaud his commitment to social change through revolution. If we consider their works dialectically, we see that Hesse presents a thesis, The Way Inward, to which Brecht poses the antithesis, social revolution. But, in spite of their large popular followings, the two authors lack the specific flavor of the sixties. It remains for an author of our generation to propose a synthesis in the contemporary tongue. In Marat/Sade, Peter Weiss reinterprets both positions and passes judgment on both.

The Marquis de Sade is a fair representation of a more contemporary Steppenwolf. Admittedly, in order to maintain his individualism over thirty-six years, the Steppenwolf image is forced to change from a diffident outsider, not half as crazy as he would like, to a confirmed madman. Yet, in many ways, the years have not radically altered the lonely creature of the steppes. He remains alienated from society, independent of politics, history and time. Unlike Borchert's Beckmann, his isolation is a proud one and originally self-inflicted. Both de Sade and Haller platonically reject the authenticity of conventional reality. For the Marquis, the only true existence is the inner one of the

imagination. Similarly, the Steppenwolf seeks salvation through interior harmony. Thus their worldviews display a frustrating dualism, best illustrated by the contrapuntal technique of Steppenwolf, in which different and conflicting levels of reality are constantly juxtaposed.

Hesse's analysis of everyday reality is a negative one. Although he recognizes limitless possibilities in the Steppenwolf's nature, he unhesitatingly applies Nietzsche's herd morality to man in general. In believing that most men are condemned to labor under the inadequacies of a bourgeois soul, Hesse assumes an essentially elitist position. His cultural pessimism is extreme. Bourgeois men will continue to erect societies which, in turn, will continue to stifle unique individuals. Echoing Freud, Hesse maintains that it is in the nature of civilization to oppress man. Society is increasingly dependent on mechanization, science, and technology. Yet these fundamental social components cannot fail to dehumanize man and mutilate the golden fiber of the divine which runs through mundane reality. The very rationalism of political systems also prevents escape into the realm of the spirit. In confining himself to a purely rational construct, man wilfully eliminates the only meaningful aspect of his existence.

Hesse condemns society as an aesthetically unpleasing static which mars the inherent beauty of life. The Marquis, while rejecting the security of pervasive and significant beauty, also finds society irrelevant. He argues that any phenomenon, no matter how excellent in itself, becomes empty when applied to great masses of people. Both Haller and de Sade participate in society; by no means do they seek a way of life within that society. They look to the world for the contribution it can make

to their individual experience. They are under no obligation to work for the general improvement of the world. Hesse even argues that the attainment of ideals is not as important as the struggle for them. He is indifferent to any goal which, when achieved, possesses an objective existence independent of himself. Only in a perpetually unrealized struggle for an unattainable, and therefore nonexistent, object can the individual successfully maintain an intensely subjective and personal approach. Thus the prospect of political action both appalls and disgusts the Steppenwolf. He deplores the activity and strife of his age. Similarly, the Marquis discovers that, for all his sadistic fantasies, in the world of reality he is unable to act: he is unable to condemn men to death, he is incapable of murder. Even the ritualistic, sadistic, and sensual murder of Marat he performs vicariously through the agency of Corday. He embraces the Revolution as an orgy of individual suffering. He rejects it as soon as it defines itself not as a festival of the flesh but as a rational, mechanical mass murder leading, he fears, "to the death of the individual, to self-denial, to the growth of an impregnable state." Through the Magic Theater, the Steppenwolf also indulges in the private satisfactions of violent war. Convinced that "this stupid, congested world (is) going to bits," Haller joins the battle not in an effort to win victory for some cause, but merely as a personal fulfillment of an irrational desire.

Refusing to become politically engaged individuals, Haller and de Sade seek refuge in the timelessness of art. Art, for Hesse, results from the reconciliation of various facets of the soul. Thus it exists independently of the outside world. The aesthetic experience, which transcends time and space, alone has value.

Steppenwolf, constructed in the form of a sonata, is a monument to Hesse's conception of art as a redeemer justifying human existence. De Sade takes a similarly detached viewpoint of art. To have meaning, art must be able to transcend finite reality. However, lacking Hesse's belief in the Immortals, de Sade has no faith in the immortality of art. Yet the realization that art, like man, is perishable only persuades the Marquis of the futility of his efforts without converting him to a different attitude.

I'm not sure I recall Sade on art in the play (?)

Because apparent reality, and action within that reality, are meaningless, the individual gains increased importance. As Max Frisch also observes, man's identity becomes a tantalizing, infinitely complex unknown. By means of the Magic Theater chess game, Hesse suggests the intriguing possibility that the multiple personalities of a single individual are susceptible <sup>to</sup> of eternal rearrangement in unpredictable patterns. Man's identity has unlimited potential of expression. De Sade comments that the basis of any political decision concerning right and wrong must be self-knowledge. Yet, because identity is fluid and mutable, the search for self-knowledge can fruitfully occupy a lifetime and action outside the individual becomes unnecessary. De Sade's inability to fix man to a single image leads him to deny any limitations to human potential. Insofar as the notion of equality imposes a ceiling on man's aspirations, he rejects it as undesirable.

good

One result of Haller's and de Sade's intense fascination with self is the urge to run the gamut of individual experience. Although their emphasis is somewhat different, each seeks personal fulfillment. The Steppenwolf has pursued various intellectual paths, seeking a shattering stimulus ever more difficult to discover. Not until middle age does he explore Pablo's fleeting



world of the sensual. De Sade, on the other hand, scorns all except physical obsessions. Yet, like any artist, he is forced to translate his sensual visions into verbal, intellectual terms. Both characters are attracted to suffering as a means of discovering and establishing individual identity. De Sade, of course, indulges in fantasies of physical torture while Haller, in spite of his venture into the world of jazz, yearns primarily for a heroic unhappiness of the mind. Their masochistic tendencies are not a manifestation of sensationalism on the part of the authors. Rather, they express the extreme individualist's contempt for placid contentment, an emotional state which alienates him from his identity. Only through physical pain or mental anguish can the individual recognize his uniqueness.

As we have seen, in many ways de Sade and Hesse reflect similar worldviews. However, there is a significant difference between them. A conviction of original sin, the primal guilt of every man, makes Hesse dissatisfied with a purely inward solution to salvation. Through humor and music, Hesse seeks a transcendent reality, the realm of Harry's Immortals, Hermine's Kingdom of Truth. Hesse would agree with the assumption of Frisch's prosecutor that it is impossible to accept oneself as an individual unless one believes in "the certitude of an absolute reality." Once Mozart has shown Haller the divine thread which binds together the apparently meaningless static of human life, Harry is able to conclude his writings on a note of faith and optimism. The possibility of rebirth among the Immortals beckons.

The thirty-odd years which separate Haller and de Sade are sufficient for the Steppenwolf figure to abandon this faith. De Sade is a disillusioned cynic. He shares with Haller a

is not this, also  
actually, "it"  
"is" them

"P. 105"



contempt for the average man, imputing his actions to consistently selfish motives. And as with Haller, his elaborate introspection often yields a feeling of self-hate. In moments of despair, however, Haller can fall back on the Immortals for guidance. De Sade, having rejected the idealism which attaches itself to abstractions outside the sphere of the individual, can only rely on his insufficient self. Hesse's counterpoint between human and divine, between time and eternity implies that order exists behind the apparent chaos. De Sade accepts, and indeed creates, chaos as his ultimate and only conclusion.

Just as de Sade is, in many ways, the contemporary <sup>counterpart (?)</sup> fulfillment of the Steppenwolf image, so Marat faithfully embodies those Marxist ideals which Brecht sets forth in Galileo and in The Measures Taken. In contrast to the inward-turning of a Steppenwolf figure, Brecht and Marat exhibit a defiant unconcern for the individual. For Brecht, Galileo is not a tragedy of the individual, but rather a tragedy of the masses, deprived of their right to rebel. Galileo shatters the bourgeois myth that history moves forward through the actions of great individuals. The people as a whole are, and must be, self-sufficient. In The Measures Taken, therefore, Brecht's heroes are four anonymous agitators who change identity uncomplainingly at the behest of the Party. For Brecht, identity is knowable and unmysterious, a fixed substance easily sacrificed.

Similarly, Marat defines the soul as "a practical thing, a tool for ruling and mastering life." His dismissal of the problem of identity is symbolic of his dismissal of the individual. Against de Sade's injunction to acquire extensive knowledge of self,

he posits immediate action for the benefit of the masses. De Sade denies equality because of the restrictions it imposes on individual freedom. Marat cares not so much whether each individual has limitless potential, but whether all men are provided with it equally.

In both Brecht and Marat, we find a committed affirmation of the importance of this world. They reject the timelessness of Hesse in favor of historicity. Because of his ahistorical approach, Hesse can allow the Steppenwolf a devotion to the "timeless" elements of the past. Marat, on the other hand, demands a complete break with the past in order to insure the success of the Revolution. The Marxist condemnation of the bourgeoisie rests on political and historical, not aesthetic, grounds. As Brecht observes in The Measures Taken, the bourgeoisie is a temporal phenomenon which must be challenged at the historical level. Marat fulfills this advice admirably in his active and unconditional defiance of "businessman, the bourgeois, the military beast." In Galileo, the villains of capitalism, private property, and oppressive minority authority also clearly appear as functions of history. We realize that the Steppenwolf's revolt against the bourgeois is a pseudo-rebellion, which erects araucaria shrines to them while denouncing their uncreative pollution of life. Hesse is not criticising the bourgeoisie as an historical class, as Brecht does, but as an unchanging and unchangeable aspect of human nature.

Neither the Steppenwolf nor the Marquis feel it necessary to commit themselves to action in worldly reality. For Brecht and Marat, action in this sphere is indispensable. Ultimately, such action must take the form of revolution. Galileo expresses the

can they really be hated?

are these villains in g.?

domination?

conviction that the role of the individual in society is to promote revolutionary change. Galileo himself eventually recognizes that the object of scientific endeavor must be the improvement of mankind, not the esoteric pursuit of pure knowledge. Brecht approves the imminent collapse of the old social order by making it a time of gaiety and celebration. Hesse's interior world is defined by a supra-rational faith conducive to transcendence of this world, not revolution against it. Brecht's reality is constructed around rational doubt. The masses must continually question the established harmony. Through reason, they must challenge all existing authority. A reasonable consideration will demonstrate the absurdity of laws which compel one man to revolve subserviently about another. Reason proclaims that every man is his own master.

Marat echoes such sentiments. The people, he asserts, must never accept the myths of the ruling class which depict the age as an era of perfect justice and harmony. Indeed, both Marat and Brecht realize that a serious danger to revolution is that "humanitarian" sympathy which preaches to the oppressed a doctrine of consoling acceptance. Galileo rejects the Little Monk's plea that his peasant parents are happier in their deluded condition. In The Measures Taken, the Brechtian chorus judging the Young Comrade censures him for showing misplaced and inefficient compassion toward an exhausted coolie. Similarly, Marat denounces the Church's hypocritical doctrine of promised reward in the next life in exchange for present suffering on earth. Instead of comforting the down-trodden, they must be educated to an awareness of the injustice of their situation. Once liberated from their easily exploited ignorance, they can be roused to action.

right,  
very good

Marat, in particular, emphasizes that physical force is vital to the accomplishment of a revolution. Only a bloodbath can force the rich to relinquish their wealth or the rulers, their power. He dismisses fear of violence as a selfish bourgeois reaction. Like Jean-Paul Sartre, Marat suggests that the centuries of mass suffering can only be repudiated by similar suffering on the part of the aristocracy. The people can only achieve humanity through the violent deaths of their oppressors. However, Brecht advocates and Marat fulfills action which culminates outside the individual. Objectivity dominates their commitment. Haller and de Sade indulge in war as in a private orgy of the senses. Brecht and Marat use violence dispassionately and purposefully, not for personal benefit but for the good of the cause.

Brecht and Marat are prepared to advocate a similar utilization of science. Hesse feels that science, as the foundation of an ugly, materialistic society, will never reveal anything about the true nature of man and will only distort those intimations of the divine which the individual can discover independently. Marat and Brecht, on the contrary, argue that as long as science is subordinated to the people, it can be a positive element of human life. Brecht, in fact, is confident that science has the potential to usher in a New Golden Age, as <sup>an alternative to its</sup> well as ~~act~~ <sup>ing</sup> as the instrument of man's oppression. Marat himself, in his role as scientist, merits Brechtian accolades. He challenges the idea of a fixed and firm creation, introducing instead the concept of a universe of unrestrained activity. Obviously, his theories, like Galileo's, have implications which could revolutionize the whole structure of society. Unlike Galileo, he is prepared to act on these implications. Marat never considers science as an end, but always as a means

read any  
Frank's Fashion  
safely?



*actually, "a criminal"*

by which to further the Revolution. In the third version of Galileo, Brecht writes that "... a man who knows the truth and calls it a lie is a crook." Marat also condemns those "servile scientists" who are willing to protect their security with lies or by bestowing power on those who are certain to abuse it.

As individualists, Haller and de Sade reject the mechanical, impersonal quality of science. Instead, they lose themselves in subjective, timeless art. For Brecht and Marat, on the other hand, it is this very unengaged aspect of art which makes it suspect. Both tend to identify art with culture and culture with the ruling class. In Galileo culture, symbolised by the Latin tongue, is a decadent attempt to shore up the shattered lies of the old order. Similarly, in Marat/Sade<sup>Weiss</sup> represents culture as an opiate of the people and speaks disparagingly of art as therapy for the insane. The concept of commitment in art is essential to Marxism. Brecht repudiates Galileo's attitude toward science in part because the latter treats his intellectual creations too artistically. Like traditional art, Galileo's pursuit of knowledge becomes timeless and therefore, in Brecht's eyes, worthless. The art which Hesse glorifies is, <sup>for example, wd be, for B,</sup> in reality, irrelevant. Art only has value when it deals in an engaged manner with contemporary problems. Thus Brecht justifies his art as a call to action. Marat too confirms that writing must always aim toward an object outside itself.

*["Eigensinn"]*

Hesse, in spite of his self-reliance, needs to believe in an absolute meaning existing beyond reality. De Sade, who rejects such absolutism, is consequently reduced to the cynical celebration of chaos. They both search for an individual solution, yet their

*I still don't see Sade + art.*

*[Science and art - intellectual pursuit]*

*but there are also the folk-market-place "art" and "art" to his historical conditions*

*there is, then, a "committed art" ?*

*yes, elitist*

*for him there is reality and quality.*



fundamental attitude toward the individual is negative. Hesse struggles with the problem of innate guilt. De Sade is convinced of the depravity of man. Brecht and Marat, on the other hand, who deal not with individuals but with masses, assume the relative goodness of humanity. In order to claim equal freedom for all, all must be equally worthy. Thus, man is basically good. It is evil systems which corrupt him. When de Sade hints at the apparent meaninglessness of life, Marat has the confidence to respond that he will "invent meaning." Unlike Hesse's Kingdom of Truth, Marat's meaning will remain within the confines of this world. As the creation and the responsibility of man, it offers a realistic foundation for the New Age. Hesse, to whom belief in social progress is synonymous with blind narrow-mindedness, is convinced of the impossibility of a New Age. Brecht and Marat, however, regard the ultimate victory of the people as an historical inevitability. Man, through the utilization of his inherent greatness, will become his own savior.

In Marat/Sade, the Marquis argues that the individual's primary responsibility is the development of self. Marat maintains that the individual must be committed to revolutionize society. Weiss refuses to adopt either position. The chaotic anarchy at the conclusion of the play is a victory for de Sade, but it does not represent Weiss' ultimate view of the nature of future society. Although he cannot ignore the problem of identity with Marat's easy simplicity, neither can he accept the validity of a purely inward retreat. Hesse's faith in the Immortals is outdated. Yet without it, any interior salvation is meaningless. Thus the Marquis' nihilistic repudiation of external reality is an impossible substitute.

Relative acc. to the historical context. Important: man can be made better.

in Steppenwolf. Marat's Ludis (1944) is a novel.

I'm not so sure.

right

On the other hand, Weiss' contention that his play is Marxist theater is not entirely substantiated by internal evidence. His attitude toward Marat, for example, is equivocal. Although Marat unquestionably represents an orthodoxly Marxist point of view, he has startling lapses. Act I, scene 8, which culminates in Marat's passionate cry, "I am the Revolution," is an admission of arrogant individualism. In allowing Marat's image to vacillate between dictator and savior, Weiss implies the possible degeneration of Communism into totalitarianism. At times he even questions whether the idyllic promises of Marxism are not a hoax. Weiss is not so sanguine as Brecht over the inevitability of a New Age. In Galileo, Brecht chooses to depict an historical period in which potential revolution, the vanguard of a new age, is betrayed by its leader. Weiss, however, describes a period after the Revolution. Presumably, it is the period which, by revolutionary definition, should be the glorious New Age. And with bourgeois complacency, Coulmier hails it as such. Yet to Weiss it is obvious that the Revolution accomplished nothing but the installation of new, no less oppressive, masters. Thus he intimates that there may exist an inherent futility in revolution, an implicit contradiction in the attempt to create a utopia from violence.

The structure of the play reflects Weiss' refusal to defend a particular position. Hesse creates Steppenwolf as a verbal sonata in order to symbolize the salvation inherent in an individual aesthetic experience. Brecht prefers the directness of a didactic play, such as The Measures Taken, in which the objectivity of instruction balances the immediacy of confrontation. In Marat/Sade, we observe the influence of Brecht's theater of alienation. However, theater of cruelty, which more closely resembles

good  
pre-Marxist;  
revolutionary  
socialist

good  
9

as such?

resembles

Hesse's subjective, inward approach, also has an important function in the structure of the play and is responsible for its elements of savagery and passion. Weiss alternates between the two styles without any attempt at resolution.

Such ambivalence of structure is intentional. A consideration of Marat/Sade suggests that, in view of the increasing complexity of the twentieth century, it is simplistic to become the disciple of a single viewpoint. A synthesis is the only possible contemporary response. However, Weiss does not propose a synthesis of the classical Hegelian variety. His synthesis is not an attempt at the amalgamation or reconciliation of divergent trends. Rather it is the application of Niels Bohr's Principle of Complementarity, which defines light as both particle and wave, to the social sphere. It is the recognition that existence is composed of irreconcilable opposites. Through the insane asylum, which Weiss establishes as a microcosm of human society, he is able to suspend as irrelevant not only the concept of Hegelian synthesis but also the Aristotelian laws of logic. De Sade's arguments successfully destroy the possibility of reducing the individual to fixed and unchanging identity. The play itself illustrates the fallacies of the law of contradiction. Thus the basis of the old world is destroyed. Society is no longer capable of division into neatly defined, uncontradictory, fixed and stable categories. Neither inner harmony nor outer revolution in itself is a complete answer. Weiss suggests that the acceptance of both as at once contradictory and complementary may eventually lead to a solution applicable to our time.